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The disinflation
process in Spain.
A look at the role
of wages (1)
1. The disinflation process and the role
of factors other than wage behaviour
This article briefly describes the Spanish dis-
inflation process since the mid eighties, with
special attention to the role of wage behaviour
in this process. Its potential role in the more dif-
ficult task of maintaining and even improving
the Spanish economy’s stability record is also
assessed. 
Chart 1 (upper panel) shows the path fol-
lowed by Spanish inflation since the second half
of the eighties and illustrates clearly the magni-
tude of the disinflation process in Spain. Follow-
ing figures of around 6.5 % for the late eighties,
the inflation rate started to decline at a slow
pace in the early nineties and this process in-
tensified in the late nineties. As a result, the av-
erage inflation rate for the 1996-2000 period(2)
was 2.5 %, a figure substantially lower than the
average rate in the late eighties (6.5 %).
To properly frame the role played by wage
behaviour, it is important to understand the role
that can be attributed to factors other than
wages in this disinflation process. In this re-
spect, the second panel in Chart 1 shows the
behaviour of real GDP growth in Spain over the
same period. Significantly, whereas cyclical
considerations may account for a sizeable por-
tion of the reduction of the inflation rate during
the early nineties, the quickening of the disinfla-
tion process in the second half of the decade
coincided with a period of a high average
growth of close to 3.5 %. Thus, it seems clear
that the position of the economy in the business
cycle cannot offer a sufficient explanation for
the recent pattern of the inflation rate.
Certainly, the rapid decline in the inflation
rate in the second half of the nineties cannot be
properly understood without a reference to a
series of important changes in the design and
stance of both fiscal and monetary policy in
Spain. The situation of the Spanish economy in
the early nineties clearly demanded some
changes in this respect, which became particu-
larly pressing after the signing of the European
Union Treaty in 1992, when the macroeconomic
stability requirements to become a member of
the future Union were made explicit. In fact, as
from 1992, fulfilling the convergence criteria set
in the Maastricht Treaty on time became one of
the main guiding principles of Spanish econom-
ic policy.
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( 1 ) This article summarises the intervention prepared
by Juan Ayuso and Pilar L’Hotellerie, from the Research
Department, for the BIS Spring Central Bank Economists’
meeting held on 2nd and 3rd March 2000.
(2) Up to 2000 Q1.
Regarding fiscal policy, the third panel in
Chart 1 summarises the important change in its
stance in the late nineties. The rising trend that
the Spanish public deficit had been following
was clearly broken in 1996. The average public
deficit in the 1996-2000 period has been around
2.5 %, whereas the figures for the 1986-1990
and 1991-1995 periods were about 4.2 % and
5.8 %, respectively. Although cyclical consider-
ations have played a role in this respect, the
break in the trend is also apparent in the so-
called fiscal impulse indicator, where cyclical
considerations have been filtered out (see
Chart 1, bottom panel). This new, less loose fis-
cal policy stance was implemented, moreover,
mainly through mechanisms to curb public ex-
penditure and to enhance its control and man-
agement.
Changes in monetary policy making started
in 1994, when a new law conferred full indepen-
dence on the Banco de España to conduct a
monetary policy geared primarily towards price
stability. One of the first decisions made by the
Governing Council elected under the new law
was to change the strategy of the Spanish mon-
etary policy. Thus, from 1995 until Spain’s in-
corporation into EMU, the Banco de España
pursued a new monetary policy strategy of di-
rect inflation targeting, which replaced the previ-
ous strategy based on (broad money) interme-
diate targets. 
The new monetary policy stance was imple-
mented as a gradual policy of disinflation from
the relatively high levels prevailing at the begin-
ning of the second half of the nineties to the lev-
els that at that time were thought to be consis-
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CHART 1
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tent with the Maastricht criteria. Chart 2 shows
how this gradualism was actually implemented
as well as the relative ease with which the dif-
ferent targets were met. As a matter of fact, the
main part of the targeted disinflation process
was completed almost one year in advance, as
the inflation figures for the last three quarters in
1997 were broadly compatible with the target
set for 1998, i.e. keeping the inflation rate
around 2 %.
To understand the nature, the final aims and
the success of these economic policy changes,
it is important to recall that Spain had tradition-
ally been a so-called high-inflation country. In-
flation had been strongly entrenched in the be-
haviour of economic agents and in the institu-
tional mechanisms underpinning the workings
of the economy. In this framework, it was clear-
ly understood that the success of any pro-
gramme aimed at reducing the inflation rate
would hinge crucially on its ability to break with
previous beliefs and behaviour or, to put it an-
other way, on its ability to be credible.
In this regard, the growing general consen-
sus in Spanish society on the need promptly to
fulfil the Maastricht criteria, the new economic
policy framework and its promising early results
laid the foundations for a virtuous circle. Within
this virtuous circle, additional headway in the
disinflation process improves the credibility of
the new policy framework and targets, hence
making further advances easier. This is in clear
contrast to the vicious circle that seemed to
have been at play before the changes. In that
vicious circle a low degree of credibility of the
economic policy targets increased the real
costs of fulfilling those targets and therefore in-
creased the probability of not fulfilling them.
This further undermined economic policy credi-
bility.
Chart 3 provides additional information to il-
lustrate – and perhaps to allow for a preliminary
evaluation of the relevance of – this virtuous cir-
cle. As can be seen, the acceleration of the dis-
inflation process in Spain took place against a
background of looser –rather than tighter– mon-
etary conditions. Regarding the patterns of
short– and long-term real interest rates and of
the real effective exchange rate (the compo-
nents of the monetary conditions index depicted
in the chart), the comparison of the average fig-
ures for the 1991-1995 and the 1996-2000 peri-
ods shows that real interest rates have de-
creased by around 4 percentage points from
levels close to 6 % and the real effective ex-
change rate has depreciated by almost 8 %.
To conclude this brief overview of the role
that factors other than wages have played in
the recent Spanish disinflation process, the re-
duction of the inflation rate has also benefited
from structural reforms in the product markets.
Moreover, transitory developments (such as the
pattern followed by commodity and oil prices in
the mid-nineties) helped curb inflation at crucial
junctures.
2. The role of wage behaviour 
All the information provided so far helps to
properly frame the analysis of both the actual
role played by the behaviour of wages in lower-
ing the inflation rate in Spain and its prospective
role in the task of maintaining price stability in
the new framework of EMU. These are the ob-
jectives of this section.
The upper panel in Chart 4 shows the pat-
tern of compensation per employee and unit
labour costs in Spain since the late eighties.
The growing moderation of wage increases is
clearly apparent in this chart, showing its impor-
tant contribution to the observed process of re-
duction of the Spanish inflation rate. Although
the crisis during the mid-nineties may account
for some – or much – of this wage moderation,
it is striking that moderation has been sustained
and even heightened throughout the late
nineties, against a backdrop of high growth.
It is worth noting, however, that wages can
contribute to shaping a context of macroeco-
nomic stability in two ways. At a “macroeco-
nomic” level, moderate aggregate wage be-
haviour can make disinflation easier if wage
claims are based on inflation expectations that
closely match monetary policy targets. Yet
there is also a “microeconomic” aspect. For
wage behaviour to contribute favourably to a
disinflation process, while simultaneously con-
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tributing to a high level of employment, wage
claims have to be flexible enough to adjust
themselves to different sectoral or firm patterns
of productivity. While being “macroeconomical-
ly” adequate, inappropriate “microeconomic”
wage behaviour can bring about changes in rel-
ative prices that may reduce competitiveness in
some sectors of the economy and might even-
tually impinge adversely on the aggregate rate
of inflation.
A more in-depth analysis of the wage mod-
eration process in Spain with a view to distin-
guishing these two aspects reveals, first, that
aggregate wage behaviour has played an im-
portant and positive role. The bottom panel in
Chart 4 shows how the gap between wage set-
tlements at the beginning of each year and the
official inflation target was sharply reduced in
the mid-1990s and that the ex-ante real wage
increase was almost brought to zero. This pat-
tern could reflect either a reduction in the equi-
librium real wage and/or a lower nominal com-
ponent of the agreed wage due to increased
credibility of the inflation target. Initially, lower
wages probably reflected a reduction in the de-
sired real wage, as a result of the recession in
1992/1993 and the related increase in unem-
ployment. However, in the following years, as
the economy recovered, wage claims continued
to be close to inflation targets as a conse-
quence of the higher credibility of the former, so
that expected inflation was equal to targeted in-
flation. Additionally, the existence of inflation-
adjustment clauses in collective agreements(3)
has helped moderate initial wage claims. This
chart therefore offers another example of how
important the virtuous circle referred to earlier
has been in explaining the prolonged low infla-
tion figures in Spain. A more credible set of in-
flation targets has contributed to moderating
wage claims and lower wage claims have re-
duced the pressure on inflation, thus increasing
the probability of meeting the targets and,
therefore, their credibility. 
Nevertheless, the picture emerging from the
analysis of wage flexibility at sector and firm
level is not so positive. Although the wage bar-
gaining system in Spain has, in principle, an in-
termediate level of centralisation, there are in
fact two important trade unions, which behave
in a highly co-ordinated way. This has been
beneficial for the disinflation process as long as
trade unions have perceived the credibility of in-
flation targets, which has allowed a reduction in
their inflation expectations to be incorporated
into the bargaining process, as described in the
previous paragraph. But, on the other hand,
strong co-ordination among trade unions has
resulted in high homogeneity of wage increases
across sectors and firms, leaving little room for
manoeuvre for sectoral adjustments.
At the beginning of the 1980s the particular
characteristics of the wage bargaining system
in Spain combined with the very high level of re-
dundancy payments determined a very rigid
structure of wages and employment. This rigidi-
ty has been addressed in several waves of
labour market reform in Spain (1984, 1992,
1994, and 1997), which in general have been
aimed at increased flexibility of employment
rather than increased flexibility of wages. 
Thus, in 1984, the use of temporary labour
contracts was given a most significant boost.
The percentage of workers with temporary
labour contracts increased rapidly through the
late 1980s to reach a level of around 33 %-
3 4 %. In the second half of the 1990s, in the
wake of the 1992-1993 recession and following
new legislative changes in 1994, the duration of
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temporary contracts started to decrease dra-
matically, giving way to a rapid increase in the
ratio of the number of contracts to wage-earn-
ers. On the whole, there has been a significant
increase in the flexibility of employment condi-
tions since the mid-1980s. Yet increased flexi-
bility only relates to one-third of all employees,
those with temporary contracts. 
On the contrary, no such significant head-
way has been made towards wage flexibility.
Wage flexibility requires both wage levels to
adapt to productivity and other firm- and sector-
related characteristics, and, ultimately, wage in-
creases to be related to productivity develop-
ments at this decentralised level. In general, a
sufficient degree of wage dispersion is needed,
both in terms of levels and in terms of rates of
change. According to the available information
on individual wage distribution (which unfortu-
nately corresponds to 1995), although tempo-
rary workers have, in general, lower wages than
permanent employees, the aggregate wage dis-
tribution in Spain is characterised by excessive-
ly high wages at the lower end of the distribu-
tion. This is due to high minimum wages for
permanent workers, which are explained, in
turn, both by the high replacement ratio (unem-
ployment benefits as a proportion of wages)
and by the existence of high entry wages.
Those entry wages are negotiated in collective
bargaining, which set high floors for minimum
wages. As a result, average wages are also rel-
atively high.
Against this background, some gradual
changes have been introduced by the labour
market reforms of 1994 and 1997. The mea-
sures taken have been geared to making per-
manent employment somewhat more attractive
for employers. In particular, in 1997 a new type
of permanent contract, with lower redundancy
payments and reductions in social security con-
tributions, was created. This contract has been
aimed at specific groups of workers (the young,
women, the long-term unemployed and – up to
1 9 9 9– temporary workers). All in all, these
measures have entailed a reduction in the cost
of labour for employers additional to that de-
rived from wage moderation itself. The effect of
such changes has been a noticeable increase
in the weight of permanent contracts up to 1999
(from 4 % of new contracts in 1996, to 9 % of
new contracts in 1999). Some measures have
also been taken to increase the adaptability of
wages to firm-level and sectoral circumstances
by introducing opt-out clauses (1994) and by
favouring collective bargaining on a multi-tier
basis (1997). 
Although the dispersion of negotiated wage
increases (calculated with sectoral data) has
tended to increase, the above-mentioned char-
acteristics of the wage distribution have proba-
bly changed little. Chart 5 shows that variability
in nominal productivity is much higher than vari-
ability in negotiated wages, even if the improve-
ments in the more recent period are taken into
account. In any case, updated micro data are
needed to confirm the extent of these changes.
Another indirect way of checking to what ex-
tent the labour market works efficiently is pro-
vided by changes in structural unemployment.
A proxy for the level of the structural unemploy-
ment rate, long-term unemployment as a pro-
portion of total unemployment, shows that the
level of structural unemployment remains high
in Spain, indicating a less than flexible perfor-
mance of the labour market. Nevertheless, in
recent years structural unemployment has tend-
ed to decrease.
3. The duality of inflation
Having analysed the aggregate contribution
to disinflation that wages have had in the past,
we now turn to assess how the process of re-
duction of inflation has affected tradable and
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non-tradable products. For the sake of simplifi-
cation, we will take services as being equiva-
lent to the sheltered (non-tradable) sector and
manufactures as equivalent to the non-shel-
tered (tradable) sector. As can be seen in
Chart 6, two-speed inflation has been a char-
acteristic of the Spanish inflation process since
the 1980s.
In Chart 7 we provide some information on
the price formation process in services and
manufactures for an insight into the causes of
this dual inflation. Looking at the contribution of
unit labour costs (ULCs) to inflation, it can be
seen that, up to 1995, ULCs increased more in
services, in part due to higher productivity
growth in manufactures. It appears that higher
inflation in services can be explained to some
extent by this type of factor (the usual argu-
ments in the Balassa-Samuelson model of dual
inflation). But some qualifications are in order.
First, higher increases in productivity in manu-
factures have been associated with reductions
in employment (in the 91-95 period). Second,
high rates of inflation in services have been ac-
companied by a widening of margins, irrespec-
tive of the cyclical situation of the economy.
Third, in the most recent period (1996-1999),
ULCs have increased more in manufactures
than in services, whereas prices have in-
creased more in services. As a result, margins
have contracted in manufactures and widened
in services.
These developments are indicative of the
lack of (sufficient) competitiveness in services
markets. As a result, price adjustments to
changes in the nominal conditions of the econo-
my tend to be delayed in these activities. Oper-
ating margins in services branches have
widened in general, although there have been
some exceptions, such as communications,
where market reforms have been implemented,
aimed at putting an end to former monopoly sit-
uations by gradually opening up the market to
new operators. 
In the comparison with the euro zone, ser-
vices prices in Spain have maintained a signifi-
cant inflation differential over the last three
years, although a gradual but firm trend towards
the reduction of this gap can be seen in the lat-
est data, as can be seen in Chart 8. This is in
contrast to producer prices for industrial prod-
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CHART 6
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ucts, the increases in which have generally
been tied to international price developments.
Nevertheless, there has been an unusual
widening of the differential of these price in-
creases between Spain and the euro area since
the beginning of 1999 (see Chart 8). This
widening has been partly related to some spe-
cial factors (i.e. increases in olive oil prices) and
possibly to a stronger impact of oil price in-
creases in the case of Spain. But it may also be
the result of insufficient adjustment to cost in-
creases through the contraction of margins in
tradable sectors showing up as an inflation dif-
ferential, with both factors pointing to a loss of
competitiveness in the non-sheltered sectors of
the economy. This loss of competitiveness
would be particularly worrying in the context of
EMU as it could start a process of adjustment of
employment and activity in the non-sheltered
sectors, jeopardising the catching-up process of
the Spanish economy.  
4. Inflation in 1999 and the outlook for
2000
Sharp increases in oil prices during 1999
have heavily affected consumer prices in Spain,
as in other countries. Given the greater weight
of energy (fuel, in particular) as an input in the
production process in services (transport), as
opposed to manufactures, the rise in energy
prices is further and damagingly fuelling infla-
tion in sectors that already exhibit very high
price increases and that are slow to adjust to
lower inflation rates. Additionally, these devel-
opments have to be placed in the more general
context of the strong cyclical recovery of the
Spanish economy, accompanied by a some-
what accommodating policy mix. As a result, as
can be seen in Chart 8, headline HICP acceler-
ated in 1999, initially widening the inflation dif-
ferential with the euro area. The year 2000 has
started with a reduction in the inflation differen-
tial vis-à-vis the euro area. In principle, over the
course of the year a downward path in the
Spanish inflation rate can be expected, as the
same factors that have contributed to widening
the differential with the euro area in 1999 may
be expected to act in the opposite direction
in 2000.
In assessing the inflation outlook for 2000,
and taking into account the relatively loose
monetary and financial conditions still prevailing
in Spain, the main risk to inflation regarding
wages is that wage negotiations incorporate the
recent acceleration in prices. Looking at wage
dynamics in 1999 and the prospects for 2000,
the fact that inflation in 1999 was finally higher
than the official target taken as a reference in
wage bargaining (2.9 % year-on-year at end-
1999, against 1.8 %) activated inflation-adjust-
ment clauses, affecting 60 % of bargaining con-
tracts. The average wage increase finally result-
ing from collective bargaining was higher than
that negotiated in the first place (2.8 % against
2.4 %). This means that due to the indexation
mechanism implicit in the clauses, the increase
in oil prices has already been incorporated to
some extent into wage increases.
For the year 2000, the information available
supports the hypothesis that the official inflation
target (2 % by the end of the year) is being tak-
en as the initial reference for collective bargain-
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ing. If inflation behaves as expected, the virtu-
ous circle of wage increases helping keep infla-
tion low will be restored. But the risks here are
twofold. The most immediate risk would be that
negotiated wage increases take as a reference
the present inflation rate (2.9 % as of April
2000). But there is no definite evidence of that
being the case. The second risk would be that
even with wage increases initially set in terms
of the 2 % inflation target (at around 2.5 %), in-
flation ends up far above the expected figure at
the end of 2000. That would once more activate
the indexation mechanism implicit in inflation-
adjustment clauses, jeopardising the process of
wage moderation and endangering the virtuous
circle of nominal stability.
5. Final considerations
The Spanish economy has been on a cycli-
cal upturn for more than five years already, and
the prospects for 2000 are for this expansion to
continue. This period of growth has provided for
a significant step forward in the process of real
convergence (catching up) with the more ad-
vanced countries of the EMU. Notably, the pro-
cess has run in combination with clear headway
towards nominal stability and a decreasing path
for inflation. To continue this process in the fu-
ture, it is necessary to act both to maintain
macroeconomic stability and to push ahead
with structural reforms. 
Maintaining nominal stability requires an ad-
equate policy mix to preserve credibility effects.
The European framework combining the single
monetary policy and the commitment towards
fiscal consolidation included in the SGP pro-
vides an adequate setting for this. In any case,
given that monetary conditions, which are set
by the Eurosystem taking into account the euro
area situation as a whole, are relatively loose
for the case of Spain, an appropriate offsetting
fiscal policy stance is especially needed.
Although this article has claimed that infla-
tion has been drastically reduced in Spain with
an important contribution by wage behaviour,
there is still room for further reforms both in the
labour market (to improve its efficiency) and in
the more sheltered sectors (to reduce dual infla-
tion). Such structural improvements are particu-
larly important as continuing structural rigidities
both in the labour markets and in the more shel-
tered sectors may ultimately result in excessive
wage increases in the non-sheltered sectors,
badly impairing their competitiveness and jeop-
ardising the real convergence process of the
Spanish economy.
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